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In September 1963 an Advisory Committee to Study Certain Munici-
pal Police Problems was established under the auspices of the Office for
Local Government of the State of New York.
In announcing the formation of this Advisory Committee, the Com-
missioner of the Office for Local Government stated:
Some of the laws relating to the powers of policemen to make arrests
outside the communities by which they are employed are ambiguous and
there is dispute as to how they should be construed.
Many policemen are now permitted by recent laws to live outside of
the communities by which they are employed. They may see crimes com-
mitted while traveling to or from work in uniform. If they do not make
arrests, they are criticized by the public. If they do make arrests outside
their regular jurisdictions, there are serious questions as to whether they
and their families are fully protected financially in case of injury or death.
Also, there may be questions as to whether they would be protected from
damage suits arising from such arrest.
Municipalities, too, are concerned as to the liabilities of their taxpayers
when their policemen make arrests outside their own communities.'
The authority of police officers to act beyond the territorial limits of
their employing municipalities presents difficult legal problems. This is
especially so in a state such as New York which has 62 counties, 62 cities,
554 villages, 932 towns, and 8 special police districts, with each of these
local governmental units having a key role to play in the process of
law enforcement throughout the state.
The author of this article has served as chairman of the Advisory
Committee to Study Certain Municipal Police Problems.2 Indeed, the
t A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1940, Cornell University. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1 Statement by John J. Burns, Commissioner of the New York State Office for Local
Government.
2 The other members of the Advisory Committee to Study Certain Municipal Police
Problems were: Milton Alpert, Counsel, State Office for Local Government; Richard G.
Denzer, Counsel, Temporary State Commission on the Revision of the Penal Law and
Criminal Code; Paul A. Hughes, Associate Counsel, State Department of Audit and
Control; William J. Lloyd, Counsel, joint Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort
Liability; Leo Murin, General Counsel, Workmen's Compensation Board; George A.
Murphy, Legislative Representative of the New York State Association of Chiefs of
Police; William K. Sanford, Executive Secretary of the Association of Towns of the State
of New York; Al Sgaglione, President, Police Conference of New York, Inc.; Herbert H.
Smith, Assistant Attorney General, State Department of Law; Donald A. Walsh, Counsel,
Conference of Mayors and Other Municipal Officials of the State of New York; and Harold
W. Weidner, Counsel, joint Legislative Committee on Villages. Throughout its deliberations,
the Advisory Committee has received invaluable assistance from Charles W. Potter, Associate
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article is an outgrowth of the work of the Advisory Committee, with
many of the ideas hereafter expressed having derived from the Com-
mittee's discussions and deliberations.3 However, the views presented in
this article do not necessarily represent the position of the Advisory Com-
mittee, but rather reflect the opinions of the writer who is solely responsi-
ble for the content of the article.
II
THE REQUIREMENT OF STATE STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
FOR EXTRATERRITORTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. The General Rule
The law is generally well settled that a municipality can directly exer-
cise police power beyond its own boundaries only if there is state statu-
tory authorization to do so.4
It must be recognized, however, that the exercise of municipal police
power may in some cases have only an indirect effect upon persons and
property outside the corporate limits. Typical of this proposition are local
ordinances which provide that sources of supply of milk, meat and other
food products which are located outside the city must be inspected and
approved by municipal officials as a condition to obtaining a license to
sell these products within the city.
In this connection, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has stated:
The inspection of dairies or dairy herds outside the city limits provided for
by this ordinance applies only to those whose milk product it is proposed
to sell in the city .... This inspection is wholly voluntary on part of the
owner of the dairy or dairy herd. If he does not choose to submit to such
inspection, the result merely is that he or the one to whom he furnishes
milk cannot obtain a license to sell milk within the city. The ordinance
has no extraterritorial operation, and there has been no attempt to give it
any such effect. The only subject upon which it operates is the sale of milk
within the city.6
The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, has said to the contrary:
Counsel, State Office for Local Government, who served informally as Counsel to the
Committee.
3 See, in this same connection, the author's comments on "Policemen and the Law" made
at the Municipal Law Seminar on June 5, 1964, in Albany, New York and pub-
lished in the proceedings of the Seminar at pages 167-70. See also the report of the Workshop
on this same topic published at pages 177-91 of the proceedings. This Seminar was held under
the sponsorship of the State Office for Local Government.
4 See generally, 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 235-43 (1964); 6 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations 562-67 (3d ed. 1949, Supp. 1963); Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers
of Municipalities in the United States 1-9, 58-73 (1955); Pock, Consolidating Police Func-
tions in Metropolitan Areas 1-5, 34-38 (1962); Rhyne, Municipal Law 310-29 (1957);
Sengstock, Extraterritorial Powers in the Metropolitan Area 1-4, 45-55 (1962); 1 Yokley,
Municipal Corporations 139-40 (1956, Supp. 1959); Anderson, "The Extraterritorial Powers
of Cities," 10 Minn. L. Rev. 475, 564 (1926); Kneier, "Territorial Jurisdiction of Local
Law Enforcement Officers," 9 N.C.L. Rev. 283 (1931).
5 State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 169-70, 68 N.W. 1066, 1068 (1896).
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It is an inherent limitation upon the powers of a city that they shall
operate only within the corporate boundaries of the municipality. Its
ordinances can have no extraterritorial effect in the absence of legislation
expressly conferring such power upon the corporation.... There is no doubt
that cities possess the authority to regulate the sale and distribution of milk
within their territorial limits. It does not follow, however, that regulation of
milk plants beyond such limits may be accomplished by permitting local
sales or distribution only on condition that such regulations be complied
with.6
There is thus conflicting authority regarding the validity of municipal
ordinances which have indirect extraterritorial effect.7 It is enough
here simply to recognize this fact without undertaking to appraise the
merits of either position since this article is concerned with the right of
a municipal corporation to exercise police power beyond its own borders
in a direct and not merely an incidental manner. The basic question
under consideration relates to the authority of a policeman8 to act in
his official capacity beyond the geographical limits of his employing
municipality-quite clearly a situation involving the direct exercise of
police power across municipal boundaries.9
The general rule, then, is that in the absence of state legislative author-
ization, municipal ordinances can have only local and not extramural
application. In view of this fact, it is not surprising that state legislatures
have in many instances made specific grants of extraterritorial police
power to municipalities within the state.10
6 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 335, 88 N.E.2d 827, 830 (1949).
7 See Tenny v. Sainsbury, 7 App. Div. 2d 514, 184 N.Y.S.2d 185 (4th Dep't 1959);
Lang's Creamery, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 224 App. Div. 483, 231 N.Y. Supp. 368
(4th Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251 N.Y. 343, 167 N.E. 464 (1929); Note, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 848(1938); authorities cited note 4 supra.
8 See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 154 (who are peace officers), 154-a (certain peace offi-
cers designated as police officers).
Section 154-a provides as follows:
As used in sections one hundred seventy-seven and one hundred eighty-a of this
chapter the following named peace officers shall also be known as police officers: any
member of a duly organized police force or department of any county, city, town,
village, municipality, authority, police district, or any member of the state police or a
sheriff, under-sheriff or deputy sheriff, other than a special deputy sheriff.
In this same connection, it should be noted that members of the New York State police
have general state-wide jurisdiction except that "they shall not exercise their powers within
the limits of any city to suppress rioting and disorder except by direction of the governor
or upon the request of the mayor of the city with the approval of the governor." N.Y.
Executive Law § 223.
9 With respect to certain cases in which the courts of two or more counties have con-
current jurisdiction of criminal prosecutions, see, inter alia, the following sections of the
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.: §§ 134 (when a crime is committed partly in one county and partly
in another), 135 (when a crime is committed on the boundary of two or more counties, or
within five hundred yards thereof), 135-a (jurisdiction over offenses committed on bridges
and in tunnels connecting boroughs in the city of New York), 136 (jurisdiction of crime on
board of vessel), 136-a (jurisdiction over the Hudson River and over the New York Bay
between Staten Island and Long Island), 137 (of crime committed in the state on board of
any railway train, etc.).
10 For a compilation of state statutes involving extraterritorial police powers, see Seng-
stock, supra note 4, at 52-54.
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It must be recognized, however, that any such delegation of extra-
territorial power is subject to certain constitutional limitations. In dis-
cussing this matter, Professor Antieau states:
Where extraterritorial police power is granted or necessarily implied,
it has ordinarily been strictly limited. And extramural powers will readily
be invalidated by the courts where such action is not reasonably necessary
to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or where it
is but a subterfuge to advantage unfairly local economic interests. There
is some possibility, too, that extraterritorial exercise of the police power by
a municipal corporation will be ruled unconstitutional as permitting govern-
ment of the people in the area by officials whom they have not chosen and
whom they cannot control.11
With respect to the point last mentioned, it is arguable that where a
state delegates extraterritorial police power to a municipality, "individ-
uals without its boundaries cannot complain; in theory they are being
controlled, not by their neighbors' representatives, but by the state
through its functionaries."' 2
In any event, the validity of any particular delegation of extramural
police power will stand or fall in the light of these constitutional con-
siderations.
B. The New York Law
Under certain circumstances, New York statutory law authorizes the
exercise of municipal police power beyond corporate boundaries, thereby
enabling a local law enforcement officer to act in his official capacity
outside the geographical limits of his employing municipality. A com-
pilation of some of the more important of these statutory provisions
follows.
1. Intrastate Close Pursuit
A village policeman 3 may not in his capacity as a peace officer make
an arrest without a warrant outside the village limits for an offense com-
mitted outside the village limits."4
Assume, however, that a village policeman sees a crime committed
11 1 Antieau, supra note 4, at 243. See also Sengstock, supra note 4, at 48-51.
12 Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 897-98 (1928). See also Anderson, supra note 4, at 577-81;
and N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1(b).13 See N.Y. Village Law § 189. The basic principles respecting the limited territorial
jurisdiction of village policemen are generally applicable to local law enforcement
officers of cities, towns, counties and special police districts.
14 See the following opinions of the Attorney General of New York: 2 N.Y. Op. Att'y
Gen. 534 (1912); N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 277 (1930); N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1935), 54 State
Dep't 25; and also the opinion of the State Comptroller of New York, Op. State Compt.
64-127 (1964).
The Attorney General has ruled, however, that a village policeman is a peace officer
within the terms of § 1897 of the Penal Law and may carry a concealed weapon outside
the village limits without a license. 2 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 277 (1930).
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within the village and pursues the offender across the village boundaries.
If the policeman, in his official capacity, then undertakes to arrest the
offender without a warrant outside the village limits, does the added
factor of close pursuit make the arrest a lawful one?
The New York law on this point has not been completely clear until as
recently as April 16, 1964.
There has been conflicting lower court authority regarding intrastate
close pursuit. 5 A 1946 discussion of this question stated:
The ease and speed with which village, city, county and state lines can
be crossed by a fleeing criminal demands continuous close cooperation be-
tween all law enforcement officers. Immediate and continuous pursuit is
often required beyond the jurisdiction of appointment in order to promptly
effect an apprehension....
[Then follows a reference to People v. Averill,16 a 1925 county court
case in New York, which held that an extraterritorial arrest resulting from
close pursuit was lawful.]
There appears to be no Court of Appeals decision on this precise
point.17
In the intervening years since 1946 and up to the present time, the
Court of Appeals has not had occasion to deal with this specific problem
of intrastate close pursuit.
The question, however, has now been settled by chapter 643 of the
Laws of 1964, effective April 16, 1964. This act, recommended by the
Advisory Committee to Study Certain Municipal Police Problems, added
new section 182-a to the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing as
follows:
§ 182-a. Close pursuit within the state by peace officers
When a peace officer is authorized by law to arrest a person without a
warrant, or to issue a traffic summons, for a crime or traffic infraction com-
mitted within the geographical confines of such officer's employing munici-
pal corporation or police district, he may make such arrest, or issue such
summons, in any part of this state outside such geographical confines, pro-
vided continuous close pursuit was necessary in order to make such arrest
or issue such summons.
As opposed to close pursuit within the state, section 860 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure deals with interstate close pursuit. This law
15 See Butolph v. Blust, 41 How. Pr. 481 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 4th Dep't 1871);
People v. Averill, 124 Misc. 383, 208 N.Y. Supp. 774 (Madison County Ct. 1925); People v.
Haber, 20 Misc. 2d 272, 191 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. App. Pt. 2d Dep't 1959);
-and People v. Preble, 39 Misc. 2d 411, 240 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Police J. Ct. Suffolk County
1963). In addition, see the following opinions of the Attorney General of New York: N.Y.
'Op. Att'y Gen. (1932), 45 State Dep't 646; N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1939), 61 State Dep't 47;
the opinion of the State Comptroller of New York, Op. State Compt. 64-127 (1964);
Note, 28 Texas L. Rev. 862 (1950).
Is 124 Misc. 383, 208 N.Y. Supp. 774 (Madison County Ct. 1925).
-17 Miller, "Arrest Without a Warrant By a Peace Officer in New York," 21 N.Y.UL.
Rev. 61, 90-91 (1946).
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authorizes a peace officer of another state to arrest a person in New York
in a close pursuit case on the ground that this person has committed a
crime in the other state which is also a crime in New York, provided
such other state "has made similar provision for the arrest and custody
of persons closely pursued within the territory thereof."
"Similar provision" has been made by Connecticut, 8 Massachusetts, 9
New Jersey,20 Pennsylvania2' and Vermont 2-the five states which
adjoin New York.
In this connection, the Attorney General of New York has ruled that
since a traffic infraction is not a crime, a New York State police officer
may not pursue a motor vehicle operator into Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania or Vermont and arrest him there for having
committed a traffic infraction in New York.23
2. Section 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a
person under arrest escapes, he may be retaken any place in the state
by the individual from whose custody he escaped.
3. Section 654 of the County Law authorizes a sheriff to deputize
municipal peace officers "for the purpose of authorizing an arrest without
a warrant outside the territorial limits of such city, town, village, or
special district, when such crime or infraction was committed within
such territorial limits in the presence of such peace officer."
4. Execution of Warrants of Arrest
Sections 155 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure govern the
execution of warrants of arrest. A warrant issued by any of the judicial
officers included in section 155 may be executed by a peace officer any-
where in the state. Under section 156 of the Code, a warrant of arrest
issued by any other magistrate, including a justice of the peace, may be
executed throughout the county; and if such a warrant is indorsed as
provided for in section 156, a peace officer may execute it in any other
county in the state.24
The same rules which apply to the execution of a warrant of arrest
govern the service of a bench warrant except that a bench warrant does
not require indorsement in order to be served in another county.2 5
18 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 54-156 (1958) (limited to felony cases).
19 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276, §§ 10A-D (1956) (limited to felony cases).
20 N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2A:155-1 to -7 (1951) (limited to felony and high misdemeanor
cases).
21 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 14-19 (1964) (limited to Pennsylvania indictable offense
cases).
22 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 5041-45 (1958) (limited to felony cases).
23 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 125 (1953). See also note 47 infra.
24 See County of Orleans v. Winchester, 63 Hun 636, 18 N.Y. Supp. 668 (Sup. Ct. 5th
Dep't 1892); N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1932), 45 State Dep't 326; N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1932),
45 State Dep't 474; N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 93 (1934); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 162 (prisoner
carried from county to city). But see N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 1(c).
25 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 304, 478.
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5. Members of the police department of a city of the second class
have "in every other part of the state, in criminal matters all the powers
of constables and any warrant for search or arrest issued by any magis-
trate of the state may be executed by them in any part of the state
according to the tenor thereof without indorsement." '26
6. Authorized Municipal Cooperation
The New York State Legislature has authorized various types of
municipal cooperation in the field of police protection.27 In many cases,
these statutory authorizations for municipal cooperation, either expressly
or by necessary implication, extend the territorial jurisdiction of the local
law enforcement officers involved.
The following are examples of permissible intergovernmental arrange-
ments:
(a) Town policemen and village policemen may under certain
circumstances be transferred to other towns or villages in the same
county.2 8
(b) A village may in some cases contract to supply police protection
to another village. 9
(c) Section 209-f of the General Municipal Law authorizes the
governor in certain cases to mobilize local police forces for duty through-
out the state. The statute further provides that the police officers thus
assigned shall have "the same powers, duties, rights, privileges and im-
munities as if they were performing their duties in the civil or political
subdivision in or by which they are normally employed."
(d) A village or town in a county having a population of 85,000
or more persons may under some circumstances obtain police aid from
another village or town in the county."0
(e) A town and a village may under certain conditions operate a
joint police department.3"
(f) The Defense Emergency Act provides that members of civil
-defense forces who are performing civil defense services anywhere in
the state shall in certain cases possess "the same powers, duties, immuni-
ties and privileges they would ordinarily possess if performing their
26 N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 142. See also N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1932), 45 State
Dep't 474.
27 See Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan Areas Study, Municipal Cooperation, A
Digest of the Law of New York Permitting Intergovernmental Service Arrangements Among
-Munidpalities of the State (rev. ed. 1963). The material relating to police protection is
found at pages 69-73. See also N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1(c); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 205, §
11(g)-(6).
28 N.Y. Town Law § 153; N.Y. Village Law §§ 188-d, 199-p.
29 N.Y. Village Law §§ 89(24-a), 188-a. See also N.Y. Munic. Law §§ 119-m to -o;
and Op. State Compt. 237 (1963).
80 N.Y. Munic. Law § 209-m.




duties in the jurisdiction in which normally employed or rendering serv-
ices.732
7. Certain Municipal Charter Provisions
An examination of the charters of a number of New York State cities
discloses recurring use of the same or comparable terminology relating
to the extraterritorial exercise of municipal police power.
The charter of the City of Albany is typical in this regard. The relevant
provisions of the Albany charter 3 state:
The members of the police force of the said city shall possess in every
part of the State of New York, all the common law and statutory powers
of constables, except for the service of civil process; and any warrant for
search or arrest, issued by any magistrate of the State of New York, may
be executed in any part of the State by any member of the police force of
said city, without any indorsement of said warrant, and according to the
terms thereof; ... 34
The legislature thus authorized Albany city policemen to exercise
the powers of constables"3 anywhere in the state. This express grant of
extraterritorial police power, however, was not made by general legisla-
tion applicable to cities and city policemen throughout the state; rather,
the delegation of power was made by special legislation enacting the
charter of the City of Albany and was thus limited to that city alone.
Does this fact have legal significance in so far as the effectiveness of the
grant of extraterritorial power is concerned? Or, to state the question
another way, do acts of the legislature consisting of municipal charter
provisions have the same force and effect as statutes enacted generally
by the legislature?3"
In answer to this question, one authority states:
[T]he word "charter," when used in connection with a municipal corpora-
tion, consists of the creative act and all laws in force relating to the corpo-
ration, whether in defining its powers or regulating their mode of exercise.
Apart from those emanating from state constitutions, all charters are legis-
lative enactments conferring the governmental powers of the state upon its
local agencies ... 37
New York is in accord with this position.3
32 N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9137 (McKinney 1961, Supp. 1964).
33 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1870, ch. 77, § 10, as amended.
84 For comparable provisions in a county charter, see the Charter of Suffolk County,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 278, § 1208.
35 For a discussion of the powers of constables, see Morrison, A Guide For Constables-
New York (1955).
36 See 3 Antieau, supra note 4, at 426.
37 2 McQuillin, supra note 4, at 466.
38 See, e.g., Lane v. Johnson, 283 N.Y. 244, 28 NE.2d 705 (1940); People v. Kane, 43
App. Div. 472, 61 N.Y. Supp. 195 (2d Dep't 1899), aff'd, 161 N.Y. 380, 55 N.E. 946 (1900);
Neddo v. New York, 194 Misc. 379, 85 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Ct. Cl. 1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div.
492, 90 N.Y.S.2d 650 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 533, 89 N.E.2d 253 (1949); La-
Guardia v. Smith, 176 Misc. 482, 27 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941), aff'd, 262
App. Div. 708, 27 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
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The fact, then, that a grant of extraterritorial police power is made to
a specific city by special legislation enacting that city's charter gives
such special legislation status equivalent to any other type of statute
enacted generally by the legislature. However, the validity of any such
delegation of extraterritorial power still remains to be determined in
accordance with the constitutional considerations mentioned earlier in
this article."
III
ARREST BY AN OFFICER COMPARED WITH ARREST BY A PRIVATE PERSON
Assume that P is a peace officer employed by Village A. In the absence
of applicable state statutory authorization, P cannot, in his official capa-
city, make an arrest without a warrant outside the territorial limits
of Village A. And, if he does not act as a peace officer, he is unable to
enjoy the protective safeguards of section 177 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which enumerates the cases in which an arrest may be made
by an officer without a warrant.40
New York, however, recognizes the validity of a citizen's arrest in
certain cases.4 ' Thus, if P, the village policeman, sees a crime committed
outside the corporate limits, there is no doubt that he can then and
there make a lawful citizen's arrest of the offender because he is clearly
acting within the terms of section 183 (1) of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure which permits a private person to arrest another "for a crime, com-
39 See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
40 Section 177. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person.
1. For a crime, committed or attempted in his presence, or where a police officer as
enumerated in section one hundred fifty-four-a of the code of criminal procedure, has
reasonable grounds for believing that a crime is being committed in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence;
3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person to be arrested to have committed it;
4. When he has reasonable cause for believing that a felony has been committed,
and that the person arrested has committed it, though it should afterward appear that
no felony has been committed, or, if committed, that the person arrested did not com-
mit it;
5. When he has reasonable cause for believing that a person has been legally
arrested by a citizen as provided in sections one hundred eighty-five, one hundred
eighty-six and one hundred eighty-seven of this code.
Compare N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32,
252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
For additional cases in which under some circumstances an arrest by a peace officer with-
out a warrant is authorized, see N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 890 (vagrancy), 894 (vagrancy) ;
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 602 (leaving scene of accident without reporting and
leaving scene of injury to certain animals without reporting), 1193 (drunken driving
coupled with an accident).
41 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 183 provides: A private person may arrest another
1. For a crime, committed or attempted in his presence;
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
See also N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 895 (vagrancy); People v. Foster, 10 N.Y.2d 99, 176
N.E.2d 397, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961), reargument denied, 11 N.Y.2d 888, 227 N.Y.S.2d
1025, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 881 (1962).
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mitted or attempted in his presence.1 42 In the words of Chief Judge
Desmond: "A private person like a police officer can arrest another
'for a crime committed or attempted in his presence.' The jurisdiction
of a policeman and of a private person is in this instance the same.14
Does this similarity extend to a search without a warrant incident
to a lawful arrest? Granted that a search incident to a lawful arrest
by an officer is permissible,44 is this equally true in the case of a citizen's
arrest?
In United States v. Viale,45 a federal criminal prosecution involving
the application of New York law on this point, the United States Court
of Appeals of the Second Circuit stated:
The rationale that justifies searches incident to lawful arrests-as outlined
in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60-61, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed.
653-would seem to apply with equal force whether the arrest is made by
an officer or a private citizen. If the arrests were valid under § 183, the
searches incidental thereto were valid also.46
An officer's arrest and a citizen's arrest are thus on the same footing
as far as any incidental search is concerned. In other respects, however,
there are differences between them.
For example, although a private person may arrest a motorist whom he
sees speeding in violation of law,4" he (unlike an officer) is not permitted
to exceed the speed limit in pursuing and arresting the offender. 48 Then,
too, although criminal sanctions may be imposed under some cir-
cumstances for resisting an officer in the performance of his duty49 as
42 See N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (1935), 54 State Dep't 25; N.Y. Op. State Compt. 64-127
(1964).
Before making an arrest, a private person "must inform the person to be arrested of the
cause thereof, and require him to submit, except when he is in the actual commission of
the crime, or when he is arrested on pursuit immediately after its commission." N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 184. And a private person who has arrested another "must, without unneces-
sary delay, take him before a magistrate, or deliver him to a peace officer." N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 185.
43 People v. Foster, supra note 41, at 102, 176 N.E.2d at 398, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
44 See, e.g., People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).
Compare N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a; People v. Rivera, supra note 40.
45 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963).
46 United States v. Viale, supra note 45, at 600; accord, People v. Trimarco, 41 Misc. 2d
775, 245 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963). But see, People v. Alberta, 37 Misc. 2d
847, 237 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Westchester County Ct. 1962).
47 A traffic infraction is deemed a crime for purposes of a citizen's arrest under N.Y.
Code Crim. Proc. § 183(1). See Sutton v. Evans, 6 Misc. 2d 952, 160 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County), rev'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 580, 168 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1st Dep't 1957), appeal
dismissed conditionally, 7 N.Y.2d 741, 162 N.E.2d 734, 193 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1959). A traffic
infraction is likewise deemed a crime for purposes of arrest by an officer without a warrant
pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177. See N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 155.
48 See People v. Nagell, 23 Misc. 2d 452, 206 N.Y.S.2d 654 (J.P. Ct. Albany County
1960).
49 N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 242(5), 1825, 1851. With respect to cases in which the use of force




well as for refusing to aid an officer in ,making an arrest,5 there are
not comparable sanctions applicable to cases of arrest by private persons.
There is an additional reason why the citizen's arrest is unable to fill
the gap in law enforcement resulting from territorial limitations on the
authority of policemen to act in their official capacity. This reason relates
to the restrictive character of section 183 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.5 In authorizing a private person to arrest another only "for
a crime, committed or attempted in his presence" and "when the per-
son arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence,"
section 183 limits the use of a citizen's arrest to cases involving the actual
commission of crime by the individual arrested. By the same token,
section 183 precludes the use of a citizen's arrest in cases characterized
by the "reasonable appearance" of criminal activity, although these are
situations in which an officer may sometimes intervene without a war-
rant.
52
Thus, for example, assume that P, the peace officer employed by
Village A, arrests D without a warrant in adjoining City B under cir-
cumstances where a felony has been committed and he has reasonable
cause for believing D to have committed it. But assume, further, that
D was not in fact the felon. In the absence of state statutory authoriza-
tion for such an extraterritorial arrest, P could not, in his capacity as
a village police officer, arrest D in the adjoining city. And a citizen's
arrest in this case would be clearly beyond the scope of section 183
and thus illegal, thereby subjecting P to personal tort liability.5"
While an unlawful arrest, whether made by a peace officer or a
private person, may subject the arrester to possible civil liability for
damages and even perhaps to criminal prosecution, it should be noted
that an unlawful arrest does not in itself invalidate subsequent judicial
proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the person arrested.
In this connection, the court stated in Rose v. McKean:54
[S]ince the Magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the peti-
tioner-defendant was physically before him, the manner in which the arrest
was made is immaterial in determining the court's jurisdiction to proceed.
The general rule has been that it is no defense to a criminal prosecution
that the defendant was brought before the court by an illegal arrest ....
While an unlawful arrest is an invasion of a person's constitutional rights
under a democracy, it has been the policy of the law to protect the citizen
from that violation of his rights by affording an action for damages for
50 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 104, 163, 169, 897; N.Y. Pen. Law § 1848.
51 See note 41 supra.
52 See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177, quoted supra note 40.
53 See, e.g., Doherty v. Lester, 4 Misc. 2d 741, 159 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1957).
54 190 Misc. 982, 76 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1948).
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unlawful arrest and providing that an unlawful arrest is a crime. (Penal
Law, § 1846). To permit the legality of an arrest to be considered in deter-
mining the jurisdiction of a court to hear evidence of the commission of a
crime would inject an unnecessary impediment in the administration of
criminal justice.r5
There are competing considerations of public policy respecting the
wisdom of restricting as opposed to expanding the use of the citizen's
arrest. 6 Without undertaking to assess the merits of these considera-
tions, one basic proposition regarding extraterritorial law enforcement
in this state is evident. This proposition is that the combined operative
effect of sections 177 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does
not solve the jurisdictional problems involved in the exercise of police
power across municipal boundaries.
IV
CHAPTER 886 OF THE LAWS OF 1962
Extraterritorial law enforcement in New York involves not only the
question of municipal police jurisdiction but also the related issue of
the financial benefits and liabilities of the peace officers and municipalities
connected with the exercise of police power beyond corporate limits.
In this latter connection, chapter 886 of the Laws of 196217 is signifi-
cant. This law, which became effective on July 1, 1963, provides as
follows:
Section 1. Whenever a police officer of any duly constituted police
force or police department in the state dies, or is injured or disabled from
performing his duties as a police officer as a result of injuries received while
in the lawful exercise of his police powers anywhere in the state, such police
officer and his dependants shall be accorded the same benefits he or they
would receive had he been acting within the geographical confines of his
employing municipality at the time of injury or death. Any such death,
injury or disability occurring outside the employing municipality shall be
deemed to have been sustained in the course of employment for purposes
of all benefits receivable, provided such police officer was actually in the
lawful exercise of his police powers at the time of injury or death.
§2. It shall be deemed a lawful exercise of police powers within the
meaning of this act for a police officer:
(a) to transport a prisoner from the place of arrest to a place of
confinement, as provided for by section one hundred sixty-two of the code
of criminal procedure;
55 Id. at 983-84, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93. See the discussion of this subject, with dtation of
authorities, in People v. Preble, 39 Misc. 2d 411, 415-18, 240 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850-52 (Police
J. Ct. Suffolk County 1963); People v. Diamond, 41 Misc. 2d 35, 244 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1963).
56 Unlike New York, California, for example, permits a private person to arrest an-
other: "3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for be-
lieving the person arrested to have committed it." Cal. Pen. Code § 837. But see Enright v.
Gibson, 219 IMI. 550, 76 N.E. 689.(1906).
57 N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 5701-03 (McKinney 1949, Supp. 1964).
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(b) to retake a rescued or escaped prisoner or one who is attempting
to escape;
(c) to deliver a material witness pursuant to the provisions of section
six hundred eighteen-a of the code of criminal procedure;
(d) to serve a subpoena or court order or other lawful process upon a
witness or party to a court action or proceeding;
(e) to follow, in hot pursuit, a person who has committed a crime or
offense or who has violated a local law or ordinance;
(f) to effectuate an arrest pursuant to a warrant;
(g) to effectuate an arrest without a warrant in any case where such
arrest is specifically authorized by law.
§3. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to:
(a) require the extension of any benefits to a police officer who at the
time of his injury, death, or disability, is acting for compensation on behalf
of anyone other than the police force or department by which he is em-
ployed;
(b) require the extension of any benefits to a police officer employed
by a police force or department which, by charter, ordinance, rule or regula-
tion expressly prohibits the activity giving rise to the injury, disability or
death, whether such charter, ordinance, rule or regulation is now in force
or is hereafter enacted or promulgated.
§4. This act shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred sixty-three.
As conceived by its sponsors, the basic purpose of this law is to pro-
vide financial protection to a police officer and his family when he is
killed or injured in line of duty outside the geographical area of his
employment. The statute undertakes to achieve this result by providing
in substance that if a policeman is killed or injured while in the lawful
exercise of police powers outside the territorial limits of his employing
municipality, he is entitled to the same benefits he would have received
had he been acting within the geographical confines of his employing
municipality at the time of his death or injury.
Soon after its enactment, however, certain questions arose regarding
the construction of the new legislation. In an attempt to resolve these
questions and generally to improve and increase the effectiveness of
chapter 886, the Advisory Committee to Study Certain Municipal Police
Problems recommended the following changes in the statute:
1. The law should be amended clearly to include policemen of county
police departments and of police districts.
2. It should be amended to provide that disablement need not occur as the
result of an injury. For example, the General Municipal Law, §207-c,
provides benefits to policemen when they are taken sick as a result of
the performance of their duties.
3. The law should be amended to provide that death, injuries or disable-
ment can be the result of either the lawful exercise of police powers or
the performance of police duties. The term "police powers" would not
always embrace the duties of a policeman.
4. The law is now limited to situations where the policeman acts within
the State of New York. It should be broadened to cover situations
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where the policeman must act either within or outside the State. For
example, it is necessary, under certain circumstances, for a policeman
to follow a person into another state in close pursuit and also to return
to this State persons charged with crimes pursuant to the provisions
of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
5. The title of the law and the second sentence of §1 indicates that the
death, injury or disability must occur "outside the employing munid-
pality." It is possible that a policeman might be injured outside the
employing municipality, but die in his own municipality as the result
of such injury. Also, it would be very difficult to establish whether an
illness actually did or did not occur outside the employing municipality.
6. The opening sentence of §2 of the law should be amended to refer to
"police duties" as well as to police powers and should clearly indicate
that such powers and duties, which are enumerated in §2, are merely
illustrative and not all-inclusive.
7. Sub-paragraph "(e)" of §2 should be amended to delete reference to
offenses and violations of local laws and ordinances. Such offenses and
violations are not always crimes or infractions for which close pursuit
should be authorized. Such sub-paragraph should be amended to refer
to "close pursuit" instead of "hot pursuit"; also to indicate that such
pursuit must be within the State and in relation to following persons
who have committed either a crime or a traffic infraction.
8. A new sub-paragraph should be added in relation to following persons
into another state, in close pursuit, in order to make an arrest pursuant
to the provisions of §860 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
9. Another sub-paragraph should be added to §2 to cover situations where
the police officer is required to return to this State, pursuant to the
provisions of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, a person charged
in this State with a crime.
10. Sub-paragraph "(a)" of §3 should be amended to indicate that the
employer of the police officer is the municipal corporation or police
district and not the police force or department.
11. Sub-paragraph "(b)" of §3 should be amended to delete the present
language and changed to read as follows:
"§3. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to: ....
"b. Increase the powers or jurisdiction of any police officer."
Some municipalities have construed chapter 886 as having increased
the jurisdiction of their police officers and have adopted very restrictive
ordinances, rules or regulations which do not permit their policemen to
exercise the normal police powers of a police officer outside the geo-
graphical confines of his employing municipal corporation or police
district.
It is believed that the new language of sub-paragraph "(b)", which is
consistent with (1) the present title of chapter 886, (2) the present
provisions of §§1 and 2 thereof and (3) the statements in the legisla-
tive memorandum supporting the bill which became chapter 886, will
relieve the fears of municipal officers and will result in fewer local
restrictions applicable to their policemen. The new provision might
also lead to the repeal, by some municipalities, of some of the existing
restrictions recently adopted pursuant to the present sub-paragraph
"(b)". We believe that the local police departments can adequately
regulate the outside service of members of their police forces by reason-
able rules and regulations.
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These recommendations were incorporated in a bill which was passed
by the 1964 Legislature.5 8 The bill, however, was disapproved by the
Governor.5 9 In his veto message, the Governor stated, in part:
- I am constrained to withhold my approval because of certain features
of the bill. Principal among these, is that the bill would repeal the power
which employing municipalities now have to limit the authority of their
policemen to take certain action outside the territorial limits of the munici-
pality. Since the bill imposes liability upon municipalities for many acts of
their policemen committed outside the municipality, it is not clear that the
locality should be completely deprived of the power to limit the conduct of
its police officers when outside the municipality.60
Although the Advisory Committee has not as yet had an opportunity
to consider and evaluate the Governor's suggestions, it will, of course,
do so as it renews its efforts to find satisfactory ways to clarify and
improve the language of chapter 886 of the Laws of 1962 or otherwise
accomplish the objective of this legislation.
58 (1964) Sen. Int. No. 3530, Pr. No. 3891 (Senator Edward 3. Speno). This bill, to-
gether with an explanatory memorandum thereon setting forth the recommendations in
the same form as they appear in this article, were drafted by a subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee appointed for such purpose.
59 See Governor's Veto Message No. 305 (April 23, 1964).
60 Ibid.
